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STATE FOR T PMCNERNEY, ISN PFOLEY, NEA/FO GGRAY, NEA/ARP  
AMEISENHEIMER, EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2026

TAGS: [ETTC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [AE](#)

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: MAYROW GENERAL ORDER UPDATE

REF: A. STATE 130845

[¶](#)B. ABU DHABI 3169

Classified By: CDA Martin Quinn, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

[¶](#)1. (S) On August 19, CDA and Econoff delivered the Mayrow demarche to MFA Assistant Under Secretary for International Cooperation Mohammad Abdul Rahim Abdul Jalil. CDA requested an update on the investigation into Mayrow and its associated group of companies. He also provided Ambassador Abdul Jalil with the list of new affiliates that will be added to the Department of Commerce's General Order.

[¶](#)2. (S) Ambassador Abdul Jalil did not know the status of the Mayrow investigation, but he pledged to look into the matter and provide the Embassy with an update. He noted that it is not easy for the UAE to investigate companies like Mayrow, and he did not know if the authorities intended to pursue a criminal case against Mayrow. He stressed that the UAE must have evidence that can be used in court, because "we do not want a company to sue us."

[¶](#)3. (S) Ambassador Abdul Jalil thanked CDA and Econoff for the new information on Mayrow's subsidiaries, and said he would provide it to the proper authorities. He requested that future information be provided in a dipnote or on Embassy letterhead (vice as a non-paper), because he said it would give the request more legitimacy in the UAE's interagency community and would facilitate tracking the status of the UAE's responses.

[¶](#)4. (S) Turning to a general discussion about sensitive Iranian items being transshipped through the UAE's ports, Ambassador Abdul Jalil stated that he did not think Iran would "risk" sending items for its nuclear or missile programs on vessels that could be intercepted at various international ports. "Why risk putting it on a ship where it could be discovered? Why not just fly these items directly into Iran?" CDA pointed out that there are many commercial reasons for sending items via sea, and that in some cases it may be the only practical way to import the material into Iran. Comment: CDA had worked with Ambassador Abdul Jalil on August 4 in an effort to have the UAE interdict an Iranian vessel carrying Chinese-origin graphite intended for use in Iran's missile program (ref B). Ambassador Abdul Jalil's comments during the August 19 meeting were in reference to this incident, but he clearly was making a broader observation about whether Iran was likely to import sensitive materials via shipping containers susceptible to detention and inspection. The unstated inference was that it is possible that dual-use items sent via sea are not intended

for Iran's nuclear or missile programs. End comment.

¶5. (S) On August 16, Ambassador Sison contacted Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed in Paris and advised him to expect delivery of the Mayrow demarche.  
QUINN